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1 Introduction
Today individuals shop at high street stores, supermarkets, as well as a variety of
online retailers: Goods often pass through more elaborate supply and distribution
chains. The manufacturer-retailer contracts that link the vertical relations, not
surprisingly, are not always identical.
Among the various vertical contracts observed in practice, this paper deals with
two, the wholesale model and the agency model. Under the wholesale model, a
manufacturer sets the wholesale price and sells to a retailer, and the retailer sets the
retail price and deals with final consumers. Under the agency model, a retailer
specifies the revenue sharing rate, before selling to final consumers at the retail
price set by a manufacturer. The agency model involves resale price maintenance
(RPM) because the retail price that is set by the manufacturer, not the retailer.
While the wholesale model remains common in a bricks-and-mortar environ-
ment, the agency model becomes predominant in online markets. Some natural
questions to ask then would be why a certain vertical contract is chosen against the
others, and which contract is beneficial to consumers. These questions appear more
relevant given the (in)famous Apple1 case that involved the switch of vertical
contracts from the wholesale to the agency model. Plausibly also due to the fact that
the agency model has been adopted by several large online retailers—e.g., Amazon
marketplace, Apple, eBay, Google and various booking websites—concerns might
arise with regard to the nature of such contracts, the powerful position of those
retailers, and whether consumers and market performance are benefited or harmed
as a consequence.
In fact, Apple was not the first antitrust case in which distinctions between the
wholesale and agency models were highlighted. In the 1967 Schwinn2 case, which
involved the adoption of territorial restraints, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that
the per se illegality of vertical restraints applied to the transactions in which
Schwinn sold bicycles to distributors for resale to dealers, a wholesale model under
which the ownership of bicycles was transferred. But the transactions in which
Schwinn sold and shipped directly to dealers and paid distributors a commission for
taking the order—an agency distribution under which Schwinn retained the
1 U.S. v. Apple Inc., et al., 12 Civ. 2826 (DLC); The State of Texas, et al. v. Penguin Group Inc., et al., 12
Civ. 3394 (DLC) (2013). In April 2010, five large book publishers in the US switched from the wholesale
model of selling e-books, which they used to have with Amazon, to the agency model put forward by
Apple. Following the price rise of e-books after the switch of vertical contracts, the Department of Justice
lodged a complaint against Apple and the publishers for their contractual agreements including a price
parity provision: The most favoured nation (MFN) clause. In July 2013, Apple and the publishers were
found to have violated antitrust law. The publishers settled, but Apple appealed. In June 2015, an appeals
court upheld the lower court’s decision. Apple sought further review from the Supreme Court, with a
claim that its actions enhanced competition. In March 2016, the Supreme Court refused to review the
case.
2 U.S. v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1966). From the 1950 s, Schwinn adopted a selective
distribution system and imposed territorial and customer restraints on its distributors and dealers. Its
distributors were authorized to sell only to franchised dealers in their assigned territories, and dealers
were allowed to sell only from authorized locations. Meanwhile, its own distribution method, the
Schwinn Plan, allowed Schwinn to sell and ship bicycles using various ways and not necessarily through
its distributors.
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ownership of bicycles—were legal. That is, the same vertical restraints were treated
differently under wholesale and agency models, and the judicial reasoning hinged
on the legal ownership of property.
If we compare Apple and Schwinn, the antitrust view towards the agency model
seems to be somewhat inconsistent. One may argue that it is due to the different
contexts in which the vertical restraints are adopted. Apple involved multiple
vertical restraints as well as horizontal conspiracy among the publishers, and the
agency model was a complementary device to the price fixing clause used. Yet, the
Court’s reasoning in Schwinn that ‘‘…it is unreasonable without more for a
manufacturer to seek to restrict and confine areas or persons with whom an article
may be traded after the manufacturer has parted with dominion over it’’3 was
heavily criticized as ‘‘it may indicate that such confinement is unlawful absent an
acceptable business justification’’ (1977). In this view, instead of the ownership of
property, what should be evaluated is the actual impact of restraints on market
performance and how such impacts differ under wholesale and agency models. In
1977, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the ten-year-old decision of the per se
illegality of restraints involved in wholesale distribution in Schwinn by applying the
rule of reason in Sylvania4 in deciding the legality of non-price restraints.
While the linear price wholesale model is well understood as the basic form of
vertical relations in economic theory (Tirole 1988), recent papers that study the
agency model tend to focus more on specific issues related to the e-book market,
such as the device—e.g., Kindle (Gaudin and White 2014); the MFN clause (Boik
and Corts 2016); and consumer lock-in (Johnson 2013)—rather than the systematic
analysis of the agency model per se.
In this paper, we seek to examine the agency model and compare it to the
wholesale model, which constitutes the basis of understanding some transformations
in vertical relations. We do so in a bilateral duopoly framework that was developed
by Dobson and Waterson (1996, 2007) which incorporates both interbrand
competition (competition between manufacturers) and intrabrand competition
(competition between retailers). When making comparisons, we focus on welfare
conditions and the relative profitability of the alternative schemes for manufacturers
and retailers. We then interpret how the results that are obtained from the
comparison are relevant and useful for the understanding of the nature of the agency
model, as well as the antitrust treatment of restraints of this kind.
With regard to welfare conditions, we find that in symmetric equilibrium retail
prices are always lower under the agency model relative to the wholesale model.
The driving force is double marginalisation: It exists under the wholesale model and
disappears under the agency model. Consumer surplus is always higher under the
agency model, whereas aggregate profits are higher under the wholesale model for a
wider range of degrees of product differentiation in the market. Social surplus is
higher under the agency model—provided that manufacturers’ goods are suffi-
ciently differentiated. Given these results, if courts were to distinguish between
restraints involved in sale and non-sale transactions, as they did in Schwinn, the
3 388 U.S. at 379.
4 Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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verdict might be more reasonably based on how the welfare impacts of restraints
differ in these two scenarios—the agency model is more beneficial to consumers—
instead of the legal ownership of property.
With regard to the relative profitability of the alternative schemes for
manufacturers and retailers, we find that manufacturer profits are always higher
under the wholesale model, whereas retailer profits are higher under the agency
model unless manufacturers’ goods are close substitutes. This result offers two
insights: First, although manufacturers, ceteris paribus, have no profit-driven
incentive to switch away from the wholesale model, the switch is considerably
likely in favour of retailers. The popularity of the agency model in some markets in
turn implies the powerful position of retailers in those markets. Second, retailers can
benefit from the differentiation at the manufacturer level under the agency model,
which contrasts with the inverse association in vertical relations suggested by
Steiner (1993) that stronger brands tend to lead to lower retail margins and higher
manufacturing margins. Hence manufacturers and retailers’ incentives are better
aligned under the agency model.
The economic theory on vertical restraints has been traditionally concerned with
manufacturer power restraints imposed by manufacturers to neutralize potential
externalities and induce retail service; this assumes that retailers have no market
power (e.g., Telser 1960), or some market power (e.g., Mathewson and Winter
1984). When we relate the above result to this strand of the literature, an interesting
question arises as to why manufacturers would adopt the agency model. In his re-
evaluation of Schwinn, Grimes (2007) tells the story behind the case as ‘‘an insecure
brand seller imposes downstream power restraints.’’5 Downstream or retailer power
restraints, he further defines, ‘‘may be imposed by the upstream seller, but the seller
acts in response to conditions of downstream power.’’ In this view, the agency
model may be an example of retailer power RPM, which is adopted by
manufacturers who are in need of brand promotion. While such retail power
restraints also serve to induce retail service provision, the underlying assumption of
the power relation between manufacturers and retailers is different from the
traditional view. This might plausibly also have been part of the story in Apple.6
Relative to the wholesale model, the higher consumer surplus and better
alignment of incentives under the agency model constitute a conflict, which is
critical in determining the antitrust status of restraints of this kind: They benefit
consumers but undercut competition. The evolution of the antitrust treatment of
vertical restraints from per se rules to the rule of reason suggests the scope of
applying the rule of reason in treating restraints of this kind. While some retailer
5 He writes, ‘‘In 1952, Schwinn had 22.5% of the market…Schwinn’s share fell to 12.8% by 1961. It was
precisely during this period that Schwinn was actively implementing a selective distribution system
designed to insulate retailers from competition and allow them to charge a higher margin. Schwinn was,
at this point, an insecure brand seller.’’
6 12 Civ. 2826 (DLC) (2013). The publishers were upset by Amazon’s $9.99 prevailing price policy,
which they feared would erode the value and price of books, including hardcover books. They agreed to
switch from the wholesale to the agency model in response to Apple’s proposal. Apple was found to have
‘‘played a central role in facilitating and executing that conspiracy. Without Apple’s orchestration of this
conspiracy, it would not have succeeded as it did in the Spring of 2010.’’
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power restraints do not meaningfully harm consumers or competition, such as those
in Schwinn, some others do. With the alignment of incentives, the agency model is
prone to additional and potentially more harmful restraints, such as the MFN clause
that was involved in Apple.7 Based on our results, we consider the economic
analysis of the actual impact of restraints, instead of the ownership of property, to be
a better support for applying the rule of reason in treating the agency model.
The paper proceeds as follows: Sect. 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3
presents the framework for our analysis, in which we characterise the vertical
relation first by the wholesale model and then by the agency model. Section 4
compares the symmetric equilibrium outcomes under the two models. Section 5
discusses the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
This paper is related to the law and economics literature on vertical restraints.
Vertical restraints are imposed by manufacturers to cope with vertical externalities
such as double marginalisation, and horizontal externalities such as pre-sale service
underprovision due to intrabrand competition (Tirole 1988). Restraints, especially
those to neutralize horizontal externalities, often allow retailers to capture some of
the industry rents. These rents have been used to provide a procompetitive theory of
restraints: Manufacturers may use these rents to entice retailers to provide
promotional efforts that are often costly. For example, Marvel and McCafferty
(1996) compare the efficiency of using RPM and exclusive territories to combat
free-riding. On the other hand, these rents may be used in anticompetitive ways by
facilitating collusion and blocking new entrants. For example, Shaffer (1991)
compares RPM and slotting allowances and finds that both restraints increase prices
and retail profits, and may be seen as practices to facilitate coordination. Asker and
Bar-Isaac (2014) suggest that the rents created by restraints for retailers can induce
them not to accommodate an entrant to the manufacturer level since entry would
reduce those rents.
The above literature suggests that the anticompetitive effects of restraints are
mostly likely to arise when they are introduced to dampen intrabrand competition
and are not meant to enhance the efficiency of the vertical relation. This may
explain why retailer-sponsored ‘‘competition-reducing’’ restraints are almost always
considered to increase prices and harm consumers, and thus are presumptively
unlawful (Tirole 1988). For example, Dobson and Waterson (2007) examine the
effects of RPM in the presence of countervailing power and find that the social
effects of RPM are likely to be negative when retailer power is strong.
In this paper, we show that although the agency model is likely to relax
competition and increase retailer profits, it is beneficial to consumers and can be
socially desirable. We suggest that the agency model is better understood as an
7 12 Civ. 2826 (DLC) at 47. ‘‘The MFN guaranteed that the e-books in Apple’s e-bookstore would be
sold for the lowest retailer price available in the marketplace.’’ See Foros et al. (2016) for an analysis of
how the MFN clause can induce the adoption of the agency model.
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example of the retailer power restraints that we mentioned in Sect. 1. A major
difference between retailer-sponsored ‘‘competition-reducing’’ restraints and retailer
power restraints, as suggested by Grimes (2007), is that retailer power restraints are
imposed with genuine business purposes, although intrabrand competition may be
reduced as a result. Specifically, strong brands have little incentive to impose
restraints that benefit retailers, because retailers that do not promote these brands to
increase sales would be worse off. However, weak or insecure manufacturers would
have to provide extra incentives to induce retailers to promote their brands, even if it
is costly for them to do so. This corresponds to the empirically verified inverse
association between the strength of brands and retail margins (Steiner 1993; Lynch
2004).
From both law and economics perspectives, contemporary vertical restraint
theory recognises retailing as a distinct stage of vertical relations and that it is a
mistake to neglect the role of intrabrand competition in affecting consumers’
choices, as well as the exercise of countervailing power (e.g., Steiner 1991; Dobson
and Waterson 1999). The understanding of the agency model as retailer power RPM
is meaningful as it helps to distinguish the agency model from being perceived as a
form of vertical integration that ignores the changing power relation between
manufacturers and retailers.8
Among the recent studies that compare different vertical contracts, our
characterisation of the agency model follows Foros et al. (2014), but the
counterparts that are used for comparison differ in their paper and ours. Their
paper compares the agency model to an alternative model in which the revenue
sharing rate and the retail price are both set by retailers, whereas our benchmark is
the wholesale model. In addition, they focus on the equilibrium contract selection
problem of firms and allow different contracts to be used in the same market,
whereas we assume common contracts and focus on the different effects of contract
forms on competition and welfare.
The comparison between the wholesale and the agency models is also made in
Johnson (2017), who studies the effects of MFN clauses based on the comparison.
The results with regard to retailer profits and industry profits in his paper are
different from ours; the differences arise because of different demand functions that
are used and different assumptions on market coverage. While he assumes market
coverage to be full, changes in demand are important in our paper.
A further related strand of literature is on markets with intermediaries.
Comparisons have been made between the two forms of intermediation: The
intermediary buys and resells a product (the wholesale model), or simply refers
buyers for a fee (the agency model) (Belleflamme and Peitz 2010). Condorelli et al.
(2013) suggest that, when information is asymmetric and the intermediary has
privileged information about consumers, efficiency increases when the latter form is
used.
8 For example, Liu and Shuai (2015) view the agency model as vertical integration and neglect the
division of industry profits between manufacturers and retailers.
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3 Model
We consider a market with two manufacturers, j = 1, 2, and two retailers, i = 1, 2.
Each manufacturer j produces a single good j, and each retailer i presents final
consumers with goods from both manufacturers: q
j
i [ 0, such that vertical contracts
are nonexclusive. Correspondingly, consumers are able to choose from four ‘‘final
goods’’ and thus make two decisions: which retailer store to shop, and which
manufacturer good to buy. This is intuitive as firms in vertically related markets
compete not only horizontally with firms at the same level over consumer demand,
but also vertically with firms at the other level over their respective shares of retail
prices. We assume manufacturer goods and retailer services to be symmetrically
differentiated and all production costs to be zero.
Following Dobson and Waterson (Dobson and Waterson 1996, 2007) and
Gabrielsen and Johansen (2015), we assume that consumers make decisions to
maximise
U qð Þ ¼
X
ij
q
j
i 
1
2
q
j
i
 2b q ji q ji þ qji qji
  c q ji qji þ q jiqji
 
 bc q ji qji þ q jiqji
 
:
This utility function gives rise to the downward sloping inverse demand function
p
j
i ¼ 1 q ji  bq ji  cqji  bcqji: ð1Þ
The parameter b 2 0; 1½ Þ measures the degree of intrabrand competition between
retailers’ services, and the parameter c 2 0; 1½ Þ measures the degree of interbrand
competition between goods.9 Retailers’ services are perceived to be wholly
differentiated when b = 0 and become closer substitutes as b! 1. Likewise, when
c ¼ 0, the two goods are viewed as perfectly differentiated and demand-unrelated;
as c! 1, they become closer substitutes.
We assume that firms behave non-cooperatively. The direct demand function is
given by
q
j
i ¼
1 bð Þ 1 cð Þ  p ji þ cpji þ b p ji  cpji
 
1 b2  1 c2ð Þ : ð2Þ
The quantity that is demanded for good j at retailer i is a function of: own price,
p
j
i ; the prices of two relatively closer substitutes, p
j
i and p
j
i; and the price of
another substitute that is further away in the product space, p
j
i. Given the ranges of
parameters, it can be easily verified that the own-price effect dominates each cross-
price effect.
The above direct demand system has two features that are worth highlighting:
First, the cross-price effect between different goods that are sold by different
9 Dobson and Waterson (1996) assume c 2 1; 1ð Þ where a negative c indicates that the goods are
complements. We do not consider this case in this paper.
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retailers is negative; oq ji =op
j
i ¼ bc= 1 b2
 
1 c2ð Þ\0, which contrasts with
our general brief that as the price of one good increases, the demand for its
substitute increases. Gabrielsen and Johansen (2015) suggest that the negative cross-
price effect can be explained as a ‘‘second-order effect’’: As p
j
i increases,
consumers would optimally switch away from good (- i, - j) and demand more
(i, - j) and i; jð Þ, as these two are relatively closer substitutes for i;jð Þ.
However, as more (i, - j) and (- i, j) are consumed, since it is relatively closer
substitutes to them, (i, j) would consequently be demanded less. This negative
‘‘second-order effect’’ dominates the direct substitution effect, leading to a negative
cross-price effect.
Second, demand is determined by two countervailing effects: A price effect, and a
market size effect. For a common price, demand becomes 1 pð Þ= 1þ bð Þ 1þ cð Þ,
which is increasing in degrees of differentiation in the market. This means that high
demand may be driven by low prices or by highly differentiated products. Some
studies consider vertical restraints that increase demand to be presumptively
procompetitive (e.g., Bork 1978); others argue that consumers may ‘‘end up with
the wrong product at the wrong price’’ (Grimes 2007). Overall, this demand system
allows for differentiation at both levels of the vertically related market to be
parameterised in a convenient form, which in turn offers clear and tractable solutions.
We assume that the manufacturers cannot directly reach final consumers. We
characterise the vertical relation first under the wholesale model and then under the
agency model. We focus on symmetric equilibrium throughout the analysis.
3.1 The Wholesale Model
The timing under the wholesale model is as follow:
1. Manufacturers set wholesale prices simultaneously. The wholesale price set by
manufacturer j to retailer i is wi
j.
2. Retailers set retail prices simultaneously. The price set by retailer i for good j is
pi
j.
Retailer i, denoted as Ri, faces the following optimisation problem
max
p1
i
;p2
i
pRi ¼ max
p1
i
;p2
i
p1i  w1i
 
q1i þ p2i  w2i
 
q2i
 
: ð3Þ
The corresponding first-order condition is given by
opRi
op1i
¼ q1i þ p1i  w1i
  oq1i
op1i
þ p2i  w2i
  oq2i
op1i
¼ 0: ð4Þ
From (4), we get
p11 ¼
1 bð Þ 1 cð Þ þ b p12  cp22
 þ 2cp21 þ w11  cw21
2
;
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p12 ¼
1 bð Þ 1 cð Þ þ b p11  cp21
 þ 2cp22 þ w12  cw22
2
;
p21 ¼
1 bð Þ 1 cð Þ þ b p22  cp12
 þ 2cp11 þ w21  cw11
2
;
p22 ¼
1 bð Þ 1 cð Þ þ b p21  cp11
 þ 2cp12 þ w22  cw12
2
:
Solve for the reduced form of the above
p11 ¼
2þ bð Þ 1 bð Þ þ 2w11 þ bw12
4 b2 ;
p12 ¼
2þ bð Þ 1 bð Þ þ 2w12 þ bw011
4 b2 ;
p21 ¼
2þ bð Þ 1 bð Þ þ 2w21 þ bw22
4 b2 ;
p22 ¼
2þ bð Þ 1 bð Þ þ 2w22 þ bw21
4 b2 :
Substituting the equilibrium second-stage prices into the direct demand function
(2), we get the second-stage quantities demanded
q11 ¼
b w12  cw22
  2 b2  w11  cw21
 
4 b2  1 b2  1 c2ð Þ þ
1
2 bð Þ 1þ bð Þ 1þ cð Þ ;
q12 ¼
b w11  cw21
  2 b2  w12  cw22
 
4 b2  1 b2  1 c2ð Þ þ
1
2 bð Þ 1þ bð Þ 1þ cð Þ ;
q21 ¼
b w22  cw12
  2 b2  w21  cw11
 
4 b2  1 b2  1 c2ð Þ þ
1
2 bð Þ 1þ bð Þ 1þ cð Þ ;
q22 ¼
b w21  cw11
  2 b2  w22  cw12
 
4 b2  1 b2  1 c2ð Þ þ
1
2 bð Þ 1þ bð Þ 1þ cð Þ :
Manufacturer j, denoted as S j, faces
max
w
j
1
;wj
2
p j ¼ max
w
j
1
;wj
2
w
j
1q
j
1 þ wj2q j2: ð5Þ
The corresponding first-order condition is given by
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op j
owj1
¼ q j1 þ wj1
oq j1
owj1
þ wj2
oq j2
owj1
¼ 0: ð6Þ
From (6), we get
w11 ¼
2 b2 cw21 þ 2bw12  bcw22 þ 2þ bð Þ 1 bð Þ 1 cð Þ
2 2 b2  ;
w12 ¼
2 b2 cw22 þ 2bw11  bcw21 þ 2þ bð Þ 1 bð Þ 1 cð Þ
2 2 b2  ;
w21 ¼
2 b2 cw11 þ 2bw22  bcw12 þ 2þ bð Þ 1 bð Þ 1 cð Þ
2 2 b2  ;
w22 ¼
2 b2 cw12 þ 2bw21  bcw11 þ 2þ bð Þ 1 bð Þ 1 cð Þ
2 2 b2  :
When we impose symmetry, the equilibrium wholesale prices, denoted as w, are
w ¼ 1 c
2 c : ð7Þ
The symmetric equilibrium retail prices and demand for each of the goods,
denoted as p and q respectively, are given by
p ¼ 1 bð Þ 2 cð Þ þ 1 c
2 bð Þ 2 cð Þ ;
q ¼ 1
1þ bð Þ 2 bð Þ 1þ cð Þ 2 cð Þ :
p* decreases in b and c: Higher values of b and c mean lower degrees of
differentiation between goods and services, and thus lower prices. q initially
decreases and then increases in b and c. This is because, as we mentioned earlier,
demand is decided by two countervailing effects: As b and c increase, on the one
hand, goods and services become less differentiated and demand for the individual
goods falls; on the other hand, price decreases and demand increases. Whether
demand for the individual goods increases or decreases in b and c thus depends on
which effect is stronger.
We present the complete set of symmetric equilibrium results under the
wholesale model, including firms’ profits in the following lemma:
Lemma 1 Under the wholesale model, there exists a symmetric equilibrium in
which
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• w* = (1 - c)/(2 - c);
• p* = [(1 - b)(2 - c) ? 1 - c]/(2 - b)(2 - c);
• q* = 1/(1 ? b)(2 - b)(1 ? c)(2 - c);
• pj = 2(1 - c)/(1 ? b)(1 ? c)(2 - b)(2 - c)2;
• pi = 2(1 - b)/(1 ? b)(1 ? c)(2 - b)2(2 - c)2.
3.2 The Agency Model
The timing under the agency model is as follow:
1. Retailers declare revenue sharing rates simultaneously. The revenue sharing
rate set by retailer i is ai 2 0; 1½ Þ, with manufacturers retaining 1 aið Þ of the
revenue.10
2. Manufacturers set retail prices simultaneously. The price set by manufacturer j
to retailer i is p
j
i :
Under this model, S j controls the retail price and faces the following
optimisation problem
max
p
j
1
;p j
2
pS
j ¼ max
p
j
1
;p j
2
½ 1 a1ð Þp j1q j1 þ 1 a2ð Þp j2q j2: ð8Þ
The corresponding first-order condition is given by
opS
j
op j1
¼ 1 a1ð Þ q j1 þ p j1
oq j1
op j1
 !
þ 1 a2ð Þp j2
oq j2
op j1
¼ 0: ð9Þ
Given symmetry, we get
pi ¼
1 bð Þ 1 cð Þ 2 cð Þ þ b 1 cð Þ þ b 1aið Þ
1ai
h i
2 cð Þ2b2 1þ 1 cð Þ2þ 1cð Þ½ 1aið Þ2þ 1aið Þ2
1aið Þ 1aið Þ
h i ;
qi¼
2 cð Þ2b2 1þ 1 cð Þ2þ 1cð Þ½ 1aið Þ2þ 1aið Þ2
1aið Þ 1aið Þ
h i
 1 cð Þ 1bð Þþ 1b2  1 cð Þþb 1ai
1ai 
b 1aið Þ
1ai
 h i
2 cð Þ2 1þbð Þ 1þ cð Þb2 1þ 1 cð Þ2þ 1cð Þ½ 1aið Þ2þ 1aið Þ2
1aið Þ 1aið Þ
h i
1þbð Þ 1þ cð Þ
:
Ri faces the following optimisation problem
max
ai
pRi ¼ maxai ai p
1
i q
1
i þ p2i q2i
 
; ð10Þ
10 We allow retailers to specify one sharing rate that applies to both manufacturers, and this does not
conflict with what we observe in real life. For example, Apple established the same rate to all book
publishers, and Google sets the same rate to all apps developers.
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which is solved in Foros et al. (2014).11 Given their results, the symmetric equi-
librium revenue sharing rates are, denoted as a
a ¼ 2 cð Þ 1 b
2
 
2 c 1þ bð Þ : ð11Þ
The symmetric equilibrium retail prices and demand under the agency model,
denoted as pA and q

A respectively, are given by
pA ¼
1 c
2 c ;
qA ¼
1
1þ bð Þ 1þ cð Þ 2 cð Þ :
pA decreases in c. q

A and c exhibit a U-shape relationship for the same reason as
under the wholesale model: Demand is decided by two countervailing effects.
However, under the agency model, b does not affect pA; hence it affects demand
only through the negative market size effect.
The following lemma summarises the complete set of symmetric equilibrium
results under the agency model:
Lemma 2 Under the agency model, there exists a symmetric equilibrium in which
• a* = (2 - c)(1 - b2)/[2 - c(1 ? b)];
• pA = (1 - c)/(2 - c);
• qA = 1/(1 ? b)(1 ? c)(2 - c);
• p jA = 2b(1 - c)[2b - c(1 ? b)]/(1 ? b)(1 ? c)(2 - c)
2[2 - c(1 ? b)];
• piA = 2(1 - b)(1 - c)/(1 ? c)(2 - c)[2 - c(1 ? b)].
4 Comparison
In this section we compare the symmetric equilibrium outcomes under the two
models. We start with the following proposition:
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, retail prices are lower, quantities demanded are
higher, and consumer surplus is higher under the agency model than under the
wholesale model.
11 Our analysis of retailers’ optimisation problems under the agency model is analogous to Foros et al.
(2014).
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Proof Appendix.
Proposition 1 is driven by the elimination of double marginalisation under the
agency model. To show this, we write p* as the sum of two mark-ups12
w|{z}
1st
þ p  w|ﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
2nd
¼ 1 c
2 c|ﬄ{zﬄ}
1st
þ 1 b
2 bð Þ 2 cð Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
2nd
: ð12Þ
As pA ¼ 1 cð Þ= 2 cð Þ ¼ w, the total mark-up under the agency model is
equivalent to the first mark-up under the wholesale model.
Double marginalisation as the driving force indicates that when the second mark-
up under the wholesale model becomes zero, there should not be any difference
between the equilibrium outcomes under the two models. This is indeed the case as
b! 1 and 1 bð Þ= 2 bð Þ 2 cð Þ ! 0. The intuition is: When retailers’ services
are close substitutes, retailers are neither able to price above costs (i.e.,w) under the
wholesale model, nor to demand positive shares from the manufacturers under the
agency model. Hence, some degrees of differentiation between retailers are essential
for us to distinguish between the equilibrium outcomes under the two models. As
long as b is smaller than one, we are able to rank the two sets of equilibrium
outcomes.
Proposition 2 In equilibrium, there exists a c0 2 [0, 1) such that social surplus is
higher under the agency model (A) than under the wholesale model (W) if
c 2 0; c0½ Þ.
Proof Appendix.
Proposition 2 implies that the agency model is socially desirable given that
manufacturers’ goods are sufficiently differentiated. We illustrate the comparison of
social surplus (S) between the two models in Fig. 1 to complement Proposition 2.
As we observe, when the condition c 2 [0, c0) is not satisfied, it is still possible for
social surplus to be higher under the agency model, but would place additional
conditions on b: As c is close to one, b needs to be closer to zero for social surplus
to be higher under the agency model. It follows that the difference in social surplus
between the two models is more responsive to changes in differentiation at the
manufacturer level.
The results on consumer surplus and social surplus from Propositions 1 and 2
imply that the rank of equilibrium aggregate profits under the two models depends
on values of b and c. Figure 1 and Fig. 2 together offer two more observations that
are worth highlighting: First, suppose that both b and c are independently and
equally likely to take up any value over the interval 0; 1½ Þ. Then there are more pairs
of b and c such that aggregate profits are lower and social surplus is higher under the
agency model than under the wholesale model. Second, as illustrated in Fig. 3,
when goods and retail services are approximately homogenous—i.e., b! 1 and
c! 1—aggregate profits and social surplus are both relatively higher under the
12 The first mark-up is w as we assume that firms incur zero marginal costs.
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wholesale model; when goods and retail services are perfect substitutes—i.e.,
b = c = 0—aggregate profits and social surplus are both relatively higher under the
agency model.
However, there is a middle region in which social and aggregate outcomes
conflict: Social surplus is higher under the agency model, but aggregate profits are
higher under the wholesale model. Policy concerns might arise if the wholesale
model is adopted. The higher aggregate profits obtained are at the expense of using
the ‘‘wrong’’ vertical contract, especially given Proposition 1 that consumer surplus
is always higher under the agency model.
Fig. 1 Social surplus
Fig. 2 Aggregate profits
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We now compare how aggregate profits are divided between manufacturers and
retailers under the two models. This not only helps to explain the observed
comparison of aggregate profits, but also offers insights on how the power relations
between manufacturers and retailers differ under the two models. As vertical
restraints theory distinguishes between restraints imposed under manufacturer and
retailer power, understanding the division of profits is therefore useful in
determining the nature of a particular restraint.
Proposition 3 In equilibrium, manufacturer profits are lower under the agency
model than under the wholesale model, whereas there exists a c00 2 c0; 1ð Þ such that
retailer profits are higher under the agency model than under the wholesale model if
c 2 0; c00½ Þ.
Proof Appendix.
Under the wholesale model, manufacturers’ per-unit profits are precisely
w ¼ 1 cð Þ= 2 cð Þ, whereas under the agency model, their per-unit profits are
their shares of pA, 1 að Þ 1 cð Þ= 2 cð Þ, which are strictly lower than w. Overall
for manufacturers, the effect of relatively higher per-unit profits under the wholesale
model always outweighs the effect of relatively higher demand under the agency
model. In contrast, retailer profits, as illustrated in Fig. 4, are relatively higher under
the agency model as along as manufacturers’ goods are sufficiently differentiated—
i.e.,c is not too high, regardless of degrees of differentiation at their own level.
Proposition 3 has two implications: First, moving from the wholesale to the
agency model, manufacturers are clearly worse off; therefore, the agency model is
never preferred by manufacturers. Instead, the agency model, per se a form of RPM,
is likely to be in favour of the retailers. Second, retailers can benefit from high
degrees of differentiation at the manufacturer level, implying that the two parties’
incentives are better aligned.
Fig. 3 Preferences over
wholesale and agency models
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We explain the second implication further: As we assume that firms behave non-
cooperatively, they would usually benefit from high degrees of differentiation at
their own level and low degrees of differentiation at the other level of the vertically
related market, such that they can exercise countervailing power and appropriate a
higher portion of industry rents. It follows that a highly differentiated brand would
leave thin margins to retailers and high margins to manufacturers (see Steiner 1993).
It is straightforward to verify that this is the case under the wholesale model. The
second mark-up in (14), (1 - b)/(2 - b)(2 - c), increases in c, meaning that retail
margin increases as manufacturers’ goods become less differentiated under the
wholesale model. Under the agency model, however, retail margin a 1 cð Þ= 2 cð Þ
is positively correlated with degrees of differentiation between goods for any given
revenue sharing rate. When the revenue sharing rate is endogenous, the relationship
is determined by a trade-off: A higher degree of differentiation between manufac-
turers can reduce retail margins as it reduces the revenue sharing rate and can
increase retail margins as it increases the retail price (which is set by manufacturers).
The combined effect may not be the same as under the wholesale model. In fact, for
c 2 0; c00½ Þ, as stated in Proposition 3, retailers under the agency model actually
prefer it when the differentiation between manufacturers’ goods is high.
5 Discussion
In this section we explain how the results that are obtained from the comparison
between the wholesale and the agency models are useful for understanding the
agency model and the antitrust treatment of restraints of this kind.
First, our results suggest that the agency model may be understood as a retailer
power restraint. Retailer power restraints, as introduced in Sect. 1, are usually
imposed by insecure manufacturers (Grimes 2007). Ceteris paribus, the agency
Fig. 4 Retailer profits
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model is not an option for manufacturers as they earn more under the wholesale
model. By choosing the agency model over the wholesale model, manufacturers
deliberately create incentives for retailers, at the expense of their own. Although
strong manufacturers have no incentive to do so, insecure manufactures may use
restraints of this kind to induce retail service and brand promotion (which increases
c). As the vertical relation moves from the wholesale to the agency model, two
things change: Retail prices are set by manufacturers instead of by retailers; and
transfer payments are revenue shares instead of unit fees. As a result, retailers do not
have to compete over prices and the vertical competition between manufacturers
and retailers is relaxed, which leaves retailers with higher rents.
Second, with regard to welfare, consumers are better off under the agency model.
It follows that if courts were to treat restraints involved in sale and non-sale
transactions differently—e.g., in Schwinn the former was illegal whereas the latter
was legal—then having legality based on the actual impact of restraints on
consumer surplus (and on how such impact differs in sale and non-sale transactions)
seems to be more consistent with the definition of the rule of reason,13 instead of the
legal ownership of property.
The better position of consumers under the agency model further explains, from
the overall welfare point of view, why Grimes (2007) might consider that some
loose forms of ‘‘inducement’’ offered by insecure manufacturers to retailers are
‘‘probably presumptively lawful.’’ Nevertheless, he retains two concerns over
vertical restraints for brand promotion: One is whether such promotion involves
deception about product quality that would eventually harm consumers14; and the
other is whether intrabrand competition is undercut too much to ‘‘maintain the
competitive distribution of strong brands.’’ While the first concern is an additional
dimension of the problem that the current paper does not deal with, the second
concern arises naturally given two possible conflicts: One is between the motive and
the impact of a restraint; and the other is between the restraint’s impact on welfare
and on competition.
Our final interpretation of results therefore addresses the above conflicts and
relates them to antitrust treatment of vertical restraints. Antitrust authorities and
courts may frequently face the first conflict. For example, in Schwinn, the Court
accepted that the distribution program was for a business purpose that enabled
Schwinn to ‘‘compete more effectively in the marketplace’’15; but the question
remained was whether ‘‘the effect upon competition in the marketplace is
substantially adverse.’’16 This appears to signal that courts attach more weight to
the impact on competition.
13 ‘‘The rule of reason is (127 S. Ct. 2712) ‘the accepted standard for testing whether a practice restrains
trade in violation of §1,’ and in application amounts to ‘an inquiry into market power and market structure
designed to assess [a restraint’s] actual effect’’’ (Martin 2009).
14 Grimes (2007) writes ‘‘…the consumer is unaware that a vertical restraint has given the retailer an
incentive to promote a particular seller’s product’’ and that products with ‘‘superior characteristics’’ may
‘‘no longer require the promotion incentives of a vertical restraint.’’
15 388 U.S. at 374.
16 388 U.S. at 375.
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Within the analysis of the impact of vertical restraints, the second conflict has
been controversial alongside the evolution of antitrust treatment. Such conflict is
appealing under the agency model given the proceeding discussion: While
consumers clearly benefit from it, the agency model is evidently more likely to
undercut competition with the alignment of incentives. While this does not mean
that the agency model would necessarily harm competition substantially, the lack of
incentives for firms to compete may itself constitute a major concern of antitrust
authorities and courts. The series of vertical restraint cases suggest that, as
highlighted by Martin (2009), if a restraint generates conflicting impacts on
competition and consumer surplus, precedence goes to consumer surplus. This
implies that, in treating vertical restraints of this kind, the rule of reason may be
more appropriate as impacts of such restraints may differ, depending on the context
in which they are used and the additional restraints that are used in conjunction,
among others.
The move from the per se rule to the rule of reason further highlights the
recognition of the importance of intrabrand competition and the powerful position
of retailers in some industries. This is because many vertical restraints, including
RPM, may not be a means through which manufacturers exercise power, but
manufacturers act in response to retailer power. The role of retailers therefore is
crucial in determining the status of retailer power restraints, and in particular,
identifying cases in which a genuine business purpose is lacking and the restraint is
mostly likely to be dictated by retailers.
6 Conclusion
The agency model is popular in some markets in recent years. However, it is not
new and involved debatable court decisions. Complementary to studies of the
agency model in a particular market, we take an alternative approach to understand
the nature of the agency model through comparing it to the wholesale model, as well
as through placing it in the context of the antitrust treatment of vertical restraints.
In a bilateral duopoly model with product differentiation at both the manufacturer
level and the retailer level of the market, we first find that, relative to the wholesale
model, the agency model benefits consumers with lower retail prices as it eliminates
double marginalisation. Hence an economic view would suggest that the legality of
restraints involved in the agency distribution in Schwinn may be better supported by
the impact of restraints on consumer surplus rather than on the legal ownership of
property.
Second, as manufacturers are strictly better off under the wholesale model
whereas retailers are more likely to be better off under the agency model, the agency
model may be an example of retailer power RPM, which is imposed by insecure
manufacturers to incentivise retailers to promote their brands. Furthermore, stronger
brands do not tend to squeeze retail margin under the agency model; hence the
incentives of manufacturers and retailers are better aligned under this model.
Overall the agency model increases consumer surplus but tends to relax
competition, which constitutes a conflict that is faced by antitrust authorities and
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courts in treating restraints of this kind. We suggest that they may be evaluated
under the rule of reason.
Unlike the traditional views on vertical relations where retailers are often
considered to be perfectly competitive and possess little market power, the rise of
the agency model implies that, ceteris paribus, retailers are in a strong position.
Understanding the agency model as retailer power RPM is meaningful for
recognising the changing power relations in some supply and distribution chains.
The potentially better position of retailers under the agency model comes not
only from reduced intrabrand competition, but also from relaxed vertical
competition given the alignment of incentives. In contrast to the extensive literature
on how restraints affect horizontal competition in vertically related markets—i.e.,
interbrand and intrabrand competition—similar analysis with regard to vertical
competition is scarce. While the current paper does not separate the effects that
come from the two dimensions, it may be a relevant topic for future research.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Given Lemmata 1 and 2, it is straightforward that p[ pA and q
\qA for
b; c 2 0; 1½ Þ. Denoting the equilibrium consumer surplus under the wholesale model
as CS and that under the agency model as CSA, we find that
CS ¼ 4
1þ bð Þ 1þ cð Þ 2 bð Þ 2 cð Þ 
1
2 1þ bð Þ2 1þ cð Þ2 2 bð Þ2 2 cð Þ2
 2b
1þ bð Þ2 1þ cð Þ2 2 bð Þ2 2 cð Þ2 
2c
1þ bð Þ2 1þ cð Þ2 2 bð Þ2 2 cð Þ2
 2bc
1þ bð Þ2 1þ cð Þ2 2 bð Þ2 2 cð Þ2 ;
CSA ¼ 4
1þ bð Þ 1þ cð Þ 2 cð Þ 
1
2 1þ bð Þ2 1þ cð Þ2 2 cð Þ2
 2b
1þ bð Þ2 1þ cð Þ2 2 cð Þ2 
2c
1þ bð Þ2 1þ cð Þ2 2 cð Þ2
 2bc
1þ bð Þ2 1þ cð Þ2 2 cð Þ2 :
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Consumer surplus is relatively higher under the agency model if
CSA  CS ¼
1 bð Þ 8b2c2  4b2c 8bc2  12b2  16c2 þ 5bþ 4cþ 29 
2 1þ bð Þ2 1þ cð Þ2 2 bð Þ2 2 cð Þ2 [ 0:
Since (1 - b)/2(1 ? b)2(1 ? c)2(2 - b)2(2 - c)2 is positive, it follows that
CSA - CS[ 0 if
8b2c2  4b2c 8bc2  12b2  16c2 þ 5bþ 4cþ 29[ 0:
The above is equivalent to
1 bð Þ 4c 1 bcð Þ þ 4bc 1 cð Þ½  þ 12 1 b2 þ 16 1 c2 þ 5bþ 1[ 0;
which can be easily verified to hold for b; c 2 0; 1½ Þ: h
Proof of Proposition 2
Denoting the equilibrium social surplus under the wholesale model as S and that
under the agency model as SA, we can write S ¼ 2pS j þ 2pRi þ CS and
SA ¼ 2pS jA þ 2pRiA þ CSA, more specifically,
S ¼ 16b
2c2  16b2c 16bc2  32b2 þ 4bc 32c2 þ 20bþ 20cþ 55
2 1þ bð Þ2 1þ cð Þ2 2 bð Þ2 2 cð Þ2 ;
SA ¼ 16bc
2 þ 4bc 16c2 þ 20bþ 4cþ 23
2 1þ bð Þ2 1þ cð Þ2 2 cð Þ2 :
Fig. 5 The relationship
between c and (SA - S)
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Given any b, the relationship between SA  S and c is illustrated in Fig. 5. SA - S
is always positive for c 2 0; c0½ Þ, whereas it may or may not be positive for
c 2 c0; 1ð Þ. SA = S at c ¼ c0. h
Proof of Proposition 3
We first compare manufacturer profits under the two models. Given Lemmata 1 and
2, pS
j
[ pS
j
A if the following holds
2 1 cð Þ
1þbð Þ 1þ cð Þ 2bð Þ 2 cð Þ2 2 cbcð Þ 2 c 1þbð Þb 2bð Þ 2b cbcð Þ½ [0:
Since 2(1 - c)/(1 ? b)(1 ? c)(2 - b)(2 - c)2(2 - c - bc) is positive, it fol-
lows that pS
j  pS jA [ 0 if 2 c 1þ bð Þ  b 2 bð Þ 2b c bcð Þ[ 0. That is, if
c\2 1 b2 þ b = 1 b2 , which always holds given b; c 2 0; 1½ Þ.
Next, we compare retailer profits: As illustrated in Fig. 6, given any b, pRiA  pRi
is positive for c 2 0; c00½ Þ, whereas it is more likely to be negative for c 2 c00; 1ð Þ. To
find c00, we evaluate pRiA ¼ pRi at b = 0, and obtain c00 ¼ 3=4. h
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